We provide a refoundation of the symmetric growth equilibrium characterizing the research sector of vertical R&D-driven growth models. We argue that the usual assumptions made in this class of models leave the agents indi¤erent as to where targeting research: hence, the problem of the allocation of R&D investment across sectors is indeterminate. By introducing an "" contamination of con…dence" in the expected distribution of R&D investment, we prove that the symmetric structure of R&D investment is the unique rational expectations equilibrium compatible with ambiguity-averse agents adopting a maximin strategy.
is, on that path characterized by an equal size of R&D investment in each industry.
In these models the engine of growth is technological progress, which stems from R&D investment decisions taken by pro…t-maximizing agents. By means of research, each product line can be improved an in…nite number of times, and the …rms manufacturing the most updated version of a product monopolize the relative market and thus earn positive pro…ts. These pro…ts have a temporary nature since any monopolistic producer is doomed to be displaced by successive improvements in its product line. The level of expected pro…ts together with their expected duration, as compared to the cost of research, determines the pro…tability of undertaking R&D in each line.
The plausibility of the symmetric equilibrium requires that each R&D industry be equally pro…table, so that the agents happen to be indi¤erent as to where targeting their investment (Grossman and Helpman [9] , p.47). The pro…t-equality requirement implies two di¤erent conditions. First, the pro…t ‡ows deriving from any innovation need to be the same for each industry: this is guaranteed by assuming that all the monopolistic industries share the same cost and demand conditions. Second, the monopolistic position acquired by innovating needs to be expected to last equally long across sectors: this requires that the agents expect the future amount of research to be equally distributed among the di¤erent sectors. As is well known to the reader familiar with the neo-Schumpeterian models of growth, future is allowed to a¤ect current (investment) decisions via the forward-looking nature of the Schumpeterian "creative destruction"e¤ect.
Expecting equal future pro…tability across sectors, however, does not constitute a su¢ cient condition for each agent to choose a symmetric allocation of R&D e¤orts: indeed, equal future pro…tability makes the investor indi¤erent as to where targeting research. As a result, when symmetric expectations are assumed the allocation problem of investment across product lines is indeterminate. First, notice that this indeterminacy in the intersectoral allocation of R&D may have powerful e¤ects on the equilibrium growth rate in this class of models, as recently pointed out by Cozzi [3, 4] . Second, indeterminacy does not depend on the focus on the symmetric equilibrium. In a recent paper 1 Giordani and Zamparelli develop an extension of the standard qualityladder model to an economy with asymmetric fundamentals where the equilibrium allocation of R&D investment turns out to be asymmetric. However, the multiplicity of equilibria still exists, because the source of indeterminacy is not the symmetric structure of the economy but the fact that, in equilibrium, the returns from R&D are equalized, which still characterizes the asymmetric extension and which, once again, makes the agents indi¤erent in the allocation of R&D e¤orts.
In this paper we provide a way to eliminate indeterminacy in this class of models.
Our reasoning goes as follows: the agents'indi¤erence -arising from the equalization of R&D returns across industries -gives them in principle the possibility of adopting a whatever (even randomly chosen) investment strategy. This makes these agents highly uncertain about the con…guration of future R&D investment, since that con…guration is the result of a decision problem analogous to the one they are currently facing. To represent uncertainty (or ambiguity) and the agents' attitude towards it, we follow the maxmin expected utility (MEU) theory axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [8] . In representing subjective beliefs this approach suggests to replace the standard single (additive) prior with a closed and convex set of (additive) priors. The choice among alternative acts is determined via a maximin strategy, where the minimization is carried out over the set of priors and is meant to represent the individuals'aversion towards ambiguous scenarios. The plausibility of individuals'aversion to ambiguity (or preference for "pure risk") has been …rst shown by Ellsberg [6] via a thought experiment (then known as the Ellsberg paradox) 2 . In particular, we follow the "" contamination of con…dence"argument, recently axiomatized by Nishimura and Ozaki [11] . As we will see, a however small "contamination of con…dence" in the expectations of the future investment'allocation annihilates the agents'indi¤erence and makes the con…guration where R&D returns are equalized across industries emerge as the unique equilibrium.
Importantly, our assumption on the agents'attitude towards uncertainty does not concern any fundamental of the economy and is to be interpreted as a way of treating "extrinsic uncertainty". Moreover, uncertainty does not a¤ect expectations on the aggregate amount of research. In fact, we introduce uncertainty to eliminate indeterminacy arising from situations where agents are indi¤erent among a set of choices.
This is not the case for the total amount of research: if agents expect the equilibrium aggregate amount of research, their choice between consumption and savings, which are channelled to the research sector, is uniquely determined and con…rms their expectations; there is no indi¤erence, which is the source of the uncertainty in the agents'
beliefs. Hence, in order to develop our argument all we need is the description of the R&D sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie ‡y describe the basic structure of the R&D sector, with particular reference to the Segerstrom's [12] formalization 3 . In Section 3 we explain the core of our argument, enunciate and prove the proposition.
The R&D Sector
In this Section we provide a description of the vertical innovation sector, which is basically common to most neo-Schumpeterian growth models. This sector is characterized by the e¤orts of R&D …rms aimed at developing better versions of the existing products in order to displace the current monopolists. We assume a continuum of industries indexed by ! over the interval [0; 1]. There are free entry and perfect competition in each R&D race. Firms employ labor and produce, through a constant returns technology, a Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the product line they target. Adopting Segerstrom's [12] notation, any …rm j hiring l j units of labor in industry ! at time t acquires the instantaneous probability of innovating Al j =X(!; t), where X(!; t) is the industry-speci…c R&D di¢ culty index.
Since independent Poisson processes are additive, the speci…cation of the innovation process implies that the industry-wide instantaneous probability of innovation is
. The function X(!; t) describes the evolution of technology; as in Segerstrom [12] , we assume it to evolve in accordance with:
where is a positive constant. Then, by substituting for I(!; t) into the expression above and solving the di¤erential equation for X(!; t) we get:
Whenever a …rm succeeds in innovating, it acquires the uncertain pro…t ‡ow that accrues to a monopolist, that is, the stock market valuation of the …rm: let us denote it by v(!; t). Thus, the problem faced by an R&D …rm is that of choosing the amount of labor input in order to maximize its expected pro…ts 4 :
which provides a …nite, positive solution for l j only when the arbitrage equation v(!; t)A=X(!; t) = 1 is satis…ed. Notice that in this case, though …nite, the size of the …rm is indeterminate because of the constant returns research technology 5 .
The …rm's market valuation at a given instant t, v(!; t), is the expected discounted value of its pro…t ‡ows from t to +1:
By plugging I(!; ) into v(!; t), we …nally obtain the following expression for v(!; t):
The usual focus on the symmetric growth equilibrium is based on the assumption that the R&D intensity I(!; ) is the same in all industries ! and strictly positive.
The suggestion of a new rationale for this symmetric behavior is the topic of the next Section.
The Refoundation of the Symmetric Equilibrium
Assume that the agent is (1 p)100% sure to face in the future a symmetric con…gura-tion of R&D investment, and that with probability p any other possible con…guration can occur. We can call this situation a "p contamination of con…dence" 6 . Aversion to uncertainty in this context implies that with probability p the agent expects the 5 In the next Section our focus will be on the individuals' investment decisions, the reason being that R&D …rms are actually …nanced by consumers' savings, which are channeled to them through the …nancial market. Thus the role of these …rms is merely that of transforming these savings into research activity. 6 To avoid confusion let us remark that in the literature this situation is usually called " contamination (which is also the phrase used in the Introduction). However, as we will see, in our context " stands for the extension of the state space.
worst con…guration of future investment, that is, the one which minimizes her expected returns 7 . Since the minimizing con…guration is a function of the agent's investment choice, this choice can then be formalized as the result of a "two-player zero-sum game"
characterized by:
the minimizing behavior of a "malevolent Nature", which selects the worst possible con…guration of future R&D e¤orts and the maximizing behavior of the agent, who selects the best possible con…guration of current R&D e¤orts.
We start our analysis at the beginning of time t = t 0 , and assume that, at this time, all industries share the same di¢ culty index X(!; t 0 ) = X(t 0 ) 8! 2 [0; 1] in order to focus on the role of expectations on the kind of equilibrium that will prevail.
Our problem can then be stated as follows. At time t = t 0 , the agent is asked to allocate a certain amount of R&D investment among all the existing industries: in maximizing her expected pay-o¤, she will take into account the minimizing strategy that a "malevolent Nature"will be carrying out in choosing the composition of future respectively, the agent's average investment per sector at t 0 and the expected average research per sector at a generic t. "( ) and ( ) represent relative deviations from these averages satisfying:
The presence of the two functions ( ) and "( ) is intended to allow for asymmetry in the agent's current and expected investment 8 9 . Note that ( ) and "( ) are unbounded above because the zero-measure of each sector allows the investment in any of them to be however big, without violating the constraint on the total R&D investment. From now on we will drop the argument t 0 in the expression for 10 l m (!; t 0 ) and enunciate the following:
Proposition 1 For a however small probability (p) of deviation ("(!)) from symmetric expectations on the future R&D investment, decision makers adopting a maxmin strategy to solve their investment allocation problem, choose a symmetric investment
The associated distribution of expected R&D e¤orts among sectors is:
Proof. If we substitute for (1), and use the condition
, our problem can be stated as:
8 These de…nitions imply:
where L(t) denotes the mass of agents in the economy at time t. With reference to Section 2 the following relation between l j and l m holds:
As in the standard quality-ladder models, here the agent is still assumed to be risk-averse, and to able to completely diversify her portfolio -by means of the intermediation of costless …nancial institutions. In fact, in order to carry out this diversi…cation, it is su¢ cient to allocate investments in a non-zero measure interval of R&D sectors (and not necessarily in the whole of them), according to a measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure of the sector space. Ambiguity here a¤ects the mean return of the R&D investment and not its volatility, against which the agent has already completely hedged. 10 As we show below, this does not result in any loss of generality.
s:t:
Notice that the …rst addend of the maximand is constant with respect to ( ) and "( ), so that it does not a¤ect the solution of the problem.
This problem admits the same solution for a however small probability p. In order to prove that the unique equilibrium is given by (!) = "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1], we will proceed through the following steps (the reader can refer to Figure 1 , where c 1 ,c 2 ,c 3 ,c 4
represent the agent's pay-o¤s).
1. We will …rst prove that, if the agent plays a symmetric strategy, (!) = 0 2. We will then prove that, if Nature chooses "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1], the pay-o¤ the agent will obtain is independent of her investment strategy (that is, c 1 = c 3 ).
3. We will …nally show that, if the agent plays an asymmetric strategy, (!) 6 = 0 in a non-zero measure set, then the worst harm Nature can in ‡ict to the agent is also associated with an asymmetric strategy, "(!) 6 = 0 in a non-zero measure set (with reference to Figure 
is a sum over ! of strictly convex functions in "(!). In fact, set:
The Game between the Agent and Nature
) is strictly convex 11 . As a result, the function
, as a sum of strictly convex functions, is also strictly convex, that is:
H("; s) is also strictly convex, being a positive transformation of the exponential of a strictly convex function; and so it is the sum of all H("; s) over Let 0( ) be the function that is identically equal to zero, i.e. 0(!) = 0 for all
. We want to show that the minimum value of ( ) occurs when "( ) = 0( ),
,..., ! N = 1, with N > 0 being an integer number. By de…nition of convexity we have:
with P N i=1 i = 1. Let us posit 1 = 2 = :: = N = 1=N , then we have:
By the continuity of G( ) and the de…nition of integral, it is:
Noting that
for all measurable functions "( ). This implies that "( ) = 0( ) is the minimizing con…guration of " satisfying 
3. (c 4 < c 3 ). Assume (!) 6 = 0 for some non zero measure set of ! 2 [0; 1]. Then the Nature's minimum problem with respect to "( ) can be stated as follows:
The solution to this problem is "[ (!)], which is the reaction function of Nature, that is, its optimal (minimizing) response to any possible value of (!). We do not need, however, to …nd it explicitly since our conclusion follows straightforwardly. We can build the Lagrangian and then derive the …rst-order conditions (f.o.c.):
, the f.o.c. with respect to " are: The intuition of the result is as follows. Under symmetric expectations (" = 0) the agent is indi¤erent as to where targeting her investment (c 1 = c 3 ); this has been the starting point of our paper. The agent also knows that, when investing symmetrically, the corresponding pay-o¤ (c 1 ) is also the minimum that she can obtain: in fact, if future investment turns out to be asymmetric (" 6 = 0) she will be better o¤ (c 2 > c 1 )
given the convexity of the pay-o¤ function in ". On the contrary, when allocating investment asymmetrically ( 6 = 0), even with a slight probability (p ! 0) that a future non-symmetric distribution will arise (" 6 = 0), our agent will expect to be targeting above average exactly those sectors that will subsequently experience above average innovative e¤orts, thus lowering the expected payo¤ as compared to the symmetric investment case (c 4 < c 3 ). As a result, since the worst that can happen while investing symmetrically (c 1 ) is always better than the worst that can happen while choosing a (whatever) asymmetric allocation of investment (c 4 ), our "cautious"agent will always strictly prefer the …rst option.
Notice that the fact that the symmetric equilibrium is being derived at the beginning of time t = t 0 does not result in any loss of generality. In fact, this equilibrium guarantees that the di¢ culty index X(!; t) starts growing at the same rate -and is therefore always equal -across sectors. This condition in turn assures that, at any point in time t, the agent continuously faces a decision problem equivalent to the one we have analyzed and, hence, continuously …nds the same optimal (symmetric) solution.
Notice also that our result holds even when the "punishment power"of Nature ("(!)) is restricted to be however small. The proof is straightforward: given "(!) 2 [ ; ] 8 2 (0; 1), steps 1 and 2 of the proof are clearly una¤ected. For step 3 notice that "(!) = 0 is always an inner point of the domain and, hence, the non-ful…llment of the f.o.c. guarantees that it is not a minimum.
We have shown that, even though the agent is "almost sure" (p ! 0) of facing a symmetric con…guration of future investment (which would leave her in a position of indi¤erence in her current allocation problem), the mere possibility of a slightly di¤erent con…guration (" ! 0) makes her strictly prefer to equally allocate her investment across sectors. The symmetric equilibrium then emerges as the unique optimal investment allocation.
